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IT’S ALL MINE, STAY OFF, AND LET ME DO
WHAT I PLEASE: AN ABYSS BETWEEN THE
RIGHTS AND DESIRES OF COASTAL PROPERTY
OWNERS AND PUBLIC PRIVILEGES AND
PROTECTIONS?
Colin H. Roberts∗

I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I will examine three established, or at least commonly
claimed, rights of coastal (littoral)1 property owners in the United States:
(1) the right to receive sediments seaward of the mean high-water line
deposited by accretions and ownership of new land uncovered by
relictions, (2) the right to exclusive use of their dry sand property, and
(3) the right to build what they wish on their oceanfront lot. Each of
these asserted “rights” at times butts heads with laws designed to
preserve and protect the public’s right to enjoy the coast and the ocean,
including the public trust doctrine, environmental statutes, and zoning
regulations. Taking each of these property claims in turn, my goal is to
see who, if anybody, is winning the battle between property owners and
the general public for the use of littoral zones. Does the answer vary
with location? What factors are giving the winner the upper hand?
When these public and private rights are at odds, can the two be
reconciled in a manner that respects the owner’s desires while
concomitantly maintaining public utility, or is this a fruitless endeavor
because the two are diametrically opposed? In what respects does the
law need to be clarified to potentially obviate issues?
∗ J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. B.A., in Political
Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies from Pitzer College.
1. A note on terminology: Littoral means abutting an ocean, sea, or lake as opposed
to riparian, which refers to rivers and streams. I will use terms like coastal, littoral,
upland, beachfront, and oceanfront interchangeably to describe the land immediately
adjacent to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (9th ed.
2009).
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Starting with “It’s All Mine,” I will explore how the phenomena of
accretion, dereliction, and avulsion, both natural and artificial, affect the
extent of an owner’s title to his or her coastal lot. I will also extensively
discuss a fairly recent United States Supreme Court case, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,
that has important ramifications for determining the boundary of an
owner’s littoral lot. Next, with “Stay Off,” I will examine how different
states have found or created public access and use rights over private
littoral property and dealt with issues arising from owners’ assertions of
exclusivity. Lastly, under “Let Me Do What I Please,” I will look at how
zoning ordinances and environmental laws, as well as condemnation,
have been used in different states to limit an owner’s ability to build
certain structures on their lots—from buildings to sea walls and piers—
for the benefit of the general public. In what cases have the courts found
the government went too far in restricting the owner’s use of his or her
littoral property, and in what cases have they said the danger to the
environment or the public’s entitled use outweighed the owner’s desire to
construct what he or she wishes?
Each of these disputes has important political, economic, and social
implications because it pits a select group of private property owners,
who are often wealthy and influential, against the general public, whose
desire to be near the ocean is steadily growing.2 On a grander scale,
these legal issues highlight the continuing debate over how to best utilize
our natural resources and the corresponding struggle for control.
II. “IT’S ALL MINE”
Littoral property owners pay vast amounts of money to live steps
from the ocean, separated only by a beautiful sandy or rocky beach on
which they can relax and pursue recreation. It is no surprise then that
littoral owners want to hold title to as much of the beach as possible,
which of course also increases the value of their property. However,
unlike other kinds of property, the boundary of a coastal lot is
ambulatory, shifting with the dynamics of the coastline caused by the
ocean, weather, and other natural and man-made phenomena. These
alterations have important legal implications for oceanfront owners. Not
only do they affect the size of a littoral owner’s land, they may also
2. “According to the United States Commission on Ocean Policy, ‘[b]etween 1970
and 2000, the population of coastal watershed counties grew by 37 million people . . . and
is projected to increase by another 21 million by 2015.’” DONALD C. BAUR ET AL., OCEAN
AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 45 (2008) [hereinafter BAUR].
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relate to issues of beach access and zoning, which I will explore in
subsequent sections of this paper.
A. Accretion, Reliction, and Avulsion
Coastal owners generally own the land up to the ocean’s high-water
mark, with the state holding the tidal waters and the land beneath them
pursuant to the public trust doctrine,3 a common law doctrine that
enumerates and “preserves the public’s right to use waterways for
‘commerce, navigation, and fisheries,’ with subsequent court decisions
expanding the doctrine to include recreational activities and
environmental protection.”4
For instance, in California, a littoral owner takes to the ordinary
high-water mark of neap tides, as distinguished from spring tides.5 In
neap tides, the high tide is relatively low and the low tide is relatively
high, so the difference between low tide and high tide is small; spring
tides, on the other hand, have extreme low tides and high tides, and so
the fluctuation is greater.6 Unlike in California, in Delaware, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Virginia littoral owners take to the
low-water mark instead.7
Littoral property owners have long had the common law right to
receive extensions of land created by accretion and reliction.8 Accretion
is defined as “the gradual, imperceptible process of accumulation of land
by depositing of material from the water.”9 Although the accumulation
of material such as sand, rocks, and mud, known as alluvion, is gradual
and imperceptible,10 over the course of time, the resulting additional dry

3. Id. at 48.
4. Colin H. Roberts, Boaters Beware: Chapter 595 Anchors State Lands
Commission’s Vessel Removal Power, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 723, 725 (2012).
5. 54A CAL. JUR. 3D Real Estate § 957 (2012).
6. Tides – Tidal Moments, SAILING ISSUES, http://www.sailingissues.com/
navcourse6.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2012).
7. Katie Tannenbaum, Beach Access, BEACHAPEDIA, http://www.beachapedia.org/
Beach_Access#Surfrider_Foundation.E2.80.99s_Stance_on_Beach_Access (last visited
Apr. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Beach Access].
8. See, e.g., Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S. 150, 156 (1855) (“Land gained by the sea
either by alluvion or dereliction, if the same be by little and little, by small and
imperceptible degrees, belongs to the owner of the land adjoining.”).
9. THOMAS STRONG, RIPARIAN RIGHTS ¶ 14, available at http://www.pdhonline.org/
courses/l124/l124content.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2012).
10. Id.
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Reliction (sometimes referred to as
land becomes apparent.11
“dereliction”) “is the uncovering of previously submerged land by a
permanent rescission of a body of water, rather than a mere temporary or
seasonal exposure of the land.”12 Therefore, when the ocean washes sand
ashore, gradually broadening the beach and pushing the ordinary high
tide line further out, or the receding ocean exposes new land,13 the littoral
owner gains the additional land notwithstanding the state’s title.
Accretion can be natural or artificial, with artificial accretion being
directly caused by human activities.14 Whether accreted land is natural
or artificial may determine the littoral owner’s right to it.15 For instance,
in California, the state retains land created by artificial accretion, but
[a]ccretion is not artificial merely because human activities far
away contributed to it; it must have been the direct cause of the
accretion . . . [t]he larger the structure or the scope of human
activity the farther away it can be and still be a direct cause of
the accretion, although it must always be in the general location
of the accreted property to come within the artificial accretion
rule.16
However, with certain limitations, other states allow littoral property
owners to retain land created by artificial accretions.17
When the change in the breadth of the beach is not gradual or
imperceptible but rather rapid and readily noticeable, the process is

11. See County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68 (1874) (“The test as to what
is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is, that though the witnesses may see
from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the
process was going on.”).
12. Michael V. Powell, Riparian Boundaries in Texas, LOCKE LORD LLP (2006) at 7,
available
at
http://www.lockelord.com/files/News/52bf6f9c-4dcc-4b59-a7e225f214016565/Presentation/NewsAttachment/7178e364-c72e-4129-8646268a72c9fc05/Riparian%20Boundaries%20-%20Powell.pdf [hereinafter Powell].
13. With climate change causing sea level rise, relictions are bound to be much less
common than accretions, if not nonexistent. For further discussion of sea level rise see
infra Part IV.B.
14. Powell, supra note 12, at 8.
15. See id. at 9 (describing how “a riparian owner does not obtain title to an accretion
when he or she caused that accretion” under Texas law).
16. 63 CAL. JUR. 3D Water § 745. See also State ex rel. State Lands Comm’n. v.
Superior Court, 900 P.2d 648, 650-51 (Cal. 1995).
17. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key
Assoc., 512 So.2d 934 (Fla. 1987) (holding that, in Florida, a landowner takes land
created by artificial accretion as long he or she did not participate in the activities
creating it).
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known as avulsion.18 Unlike accretion, new land added to the edge of a
littoral property owner’s lot by avulsion goes to the state, not the
landowner.19
B. “A Case Study”: Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection
In Florida, the boundary between state land and littoral property is
the mean high-water line, defined as the average height of high waters
over a nineteen-year period.20 Under Florida law, littoral owners have
“the right of access to the water, the right to use the water for certain
purposes, the right to have an unobstructed view of the water, and the
right to receive accretions and relictions to the littoral property.”21
Unlike California, littoral property owners can claim land created by
artificial accretion, as long as the owner did not cause the accretion
himself; but similar to California, littoral owners do not take land added
by avulsion, natural or artificial.22
In 1961, the Florida legislature passed the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act (BSPA), which “establishes procedures for ‘beach
restoration and nourishment projects’ designed to deposit sand on eroded
beaches (restoration) and to maintain the deposited sand
(nourishment).”23 Under BSPA, local governments apply to the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection (Department) for funds to do a
restoration or nourishment project.24 If the project involves filling
submerged lands, authorization is required from the Board of Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board).25 The Board sets a fixed
“erosion control line” (ECL) that replaces the moving mean high-water
line as the boundary between littoral property and state land.26
Therefore, when accretions add land and push the mean high-water line
seaward, the boundary between private and state lands does not move to
the new high-water line; the boundary remains at the ECL and the littoral

18. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 826 (1989).
19. See State ex rel. State Lands Comm’n., 900 P.2d at 660.
20. Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2598 (2010).
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 2599 (internal citations omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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owners do not take title to the accretions.27 However, littoral owners
retain all other common-law littoral rights.28 If the beach erodes back
past the ECL over a substantial distance, the Board may on its own
restore the beach to the ECL, and must restore it if asked by a majority of
the owners and lessees in the affected area.29 If the Board does not act
within one year, the project is canceled and the ECL is retracted.30
In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County applied to restore 6.9
miles of beach eroded by hurricanes by adding seventy-five feet of sand
seaward of the mean high-water line (what would become the ECL).31
The Department stated its intent to issue the permits and the ECL was
accepted by the Board.32 A group of littoral property owners in the
project area formed a nonprofit corporation, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. (SBR), and expressed their disapproval for the
project, but the permits were still issued.33 SBR next challenged the
project in state court under Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act.34
The appellate court determined that BSPA “eliminated two of the [SBR]
Member’s littoral rights: (1) the right to receive accretions to their
property; and (2) the right to have contact of their property with the
water remain intact.”35 Because the BSPA, in the court’s opinion,
amounted to an unconstitutional taking “which would ‘unreasonably
infringe on [littoral] rights,’” the local governments were required to
show that they “owned or had a property interest in the upland
property.”36
Although the District Court of Appeal vacated and remanded the
Department’s approval for the permits, it also certified the question to the
Florida Supreme Court of whether BSPA, on its face, amounted to a
taking of littoral property owners’ rights without just compensation.37
The Florida Supreme Court determined that it did not because accretions
are “a future contingent interest, not a vested property right,” and “there
is no littoral right to contact with the water independent of the littoral

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2600.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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right of access, which the Act does not infringe.”38 The Florida Supreme
Court also admonished the Court of Appeal “for not considering the
doctrine of avulsion, which it concluded permitted the State to reclaim
the restored beach on behalf of the public.”39 SBR’s request for
rehearing was denied, but the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the Florida Supreme Court’s upholding
of the project constituted a “judicial taking.”40
The United States Supreme Court held that the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision that the BSPA is constitutional did not create a “judicial
taking” of land contrary to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as
applied to Florida via the Fourteenth Amendment.41 The Court stated that
in order for there to be a taking SBR must have shown that they “had
rights to future accretions and contact with the water superior to the
State’s right to fill in its submerged land.”42 The Court noted that this
case featured the collision of “[t]wo core principles of Florida property
law”43:
First, the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to
littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does
not interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral
landowners. Second, . . . if an avulsion exposes land seaward of
littoral property that had previously been submerged, that land
belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner’s
contact with the water. The issue here is whether there is an
exception to this rule when the State is the cause of the avulsion.
Prior law suggests there is not.44
The Supreme Court agreed with the Florida court that the beach
restoration project was merely reclamation of the public’s land by the
state.45 Furthermore, because there is no difference between artificial
and natural avulsion under Florida law, the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision did not eliminate the right to accretions, it “merely held that the
right was not implicated by the beach-restoration project, because the
doctrine of avulsion applied.”46
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2613.
Id. at 2611.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 2612.
Id.
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that it might not be fair to littoral
property owners that state-created avulsions change the nature and value
of their oceanfront property and perhaps state-created avulsions should
be treated differently from natural avulsions in regards to its effect on
rights to accretions. The Court was handcuffed by the fact that Florida
law recognizes no difference between the two because “[t]he Takings
Clause only protects property rights as they are established under state
law, not as they might have been established or ought to have been
established.”47 The Court declined to hold that “the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision eliminated a right of accretion established under Florida
law.”48
The Court quickly dispelled SBR’s second argument, that the BSPA
project constituted a taking because it abridged the owners’ right to have
the ocean contact their property, agreeing with the Florida Supreme
Court that there is no right to contact with the water independent of the
right of access, which was not affected by the project.49 The Court stated
that a right to contact with the water is simply unworkable because land
created by avulsion automatically goes to the state.50
This case is a good example of a state’s interest in holding land and
maintaining it for the benefit of the public. All coastal states face the
dilemma of how to treat added littoral land, and it is clear that—at least
with regard to these Florida restoration projects—the public is
“winning.”
C. Drawing a Line in the Sand: Where is the Property Line Between
State and Private Property?
As exemplified by Stop the Beach Renourishment, accretion,
reliction, and avulsion are complicated, inexact doctrines that have
important implications for littoral property owners. This observation
begs the question: should there be more defined standards, such as set
measurements, to determine when these processes occur, rather than
relying on vague terms such as “gradual” and “perceptible”? If so, what
should these standards be? If, hypothetically, a storm washes ashore two
or three inches of sediment in a few days, is that amount so nominal that
it should be considered an accretion even if a keen observer could see the
difference?
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2612-13.
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Furthermore, as alluded to by the Supreme Court in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, the law may not be completely fair to oceanfront coastal
owners.51 Should Florida littoral owners’ be entitled to land created by
artificial avulsion in a manner similar to artificial accretion, or is it an
unfair windfall for littoral owners to get a new chunk of private property
regardless of how it was created, and especially if the state footed the
bill?
There is not even consensus across the country on where high-tide
lines lie in a legal and scientific sense. While California calculates it
based on neap tides,52 others states, such as Florida, do not distinguish
between neap and spring tides.53 Still others simply use the vegetation
line.54 The federal government calculates the high-tide line as the
“average height of all tides over a full tide cycle of 18.6 years.”55 Some
have proposed the uniform adoption of this standard, but this would
cause chaos for owners of existing structures.56
The backdrop for these questions and issues is the broader struggle
between public and private interests that this paper attempts to
encapsulate. The state holds submerged land in public trust,57 but littoral
owners pay vast amounts to own a piece of the beach. However, a
compromise has generally been reached allowing owners to hold much
of the beach as private property, with corresponding private rights,
subject to certain limitations. Complications to this general arrangement
will be examined in the following sections. The state and littoral owners
have essentially played to a draw, but as Stop the Beach Renourishment
illustrates, the state sometimes gets the upper hand because it makes the
rules.
51. See id.
52. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COASTAL SCIENCE 248 (M. Schwartz ed., 2005).
53. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2598 (explaining that
Florida uses “the average reach of high tide over the preceding 19 years,” thus,
differences in spring and neap tides are not specifically important).
54. WALLACE KAUFMAN & ORRIN H. PILKEY, JR., THE BEACHES ARE MOVING: THE
DROWNING OF AMERICA’S SHORELINE 248 (7th prtg. 1998) [hereinafter THE BEACHES ARE
MOVING]. See also 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE § 7H.0305 (a)(5) (2012) (“The vegetation
line refers to the first line of stable natural vegetation, which shall be used as the
reference point for measuring oceanfront setbacks. This line represents the boundary
between the normal dry-sand beach, which is subject to constant flux due to waves, tides,
storms and wind, and the more stable upland areas. The vegetation line is generally
located at or immediately oceanward of the seaward toe of the frontal dune or erosion
escarpment.”).
55. THE BEACHES ARE MOVING, supra note 54, at 248.
56. Id.
57. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2598.
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III. “STAY OFF”
The right of exclusion is perhaps the most cherished property right in
the proverbial bundle of sticks; it is, after all, what makes private
property “private.” Understandably, oceanfront owners want to lie on
their private beaches and gaze at the crashing waves without having to
stare at the back of people’s heads and without being disturbed by the
noises they make, or worse, the trash they may leave behind. However,
because tidelands are held in public trust, littoral owners cannot always
simply kick others off. Perhaps the phrase “Stay Off” is a bit misleading
because this article intends to discuss how courts and legislatures have
used the common law and statutes to determine when there is a right of
public beach access and use, not the per se legality of efforts made by
oceanfront property owners to prevent others from crossing their
beaches. A whole paper could be devoted solely to that topic.58
However, the legality of these efforts to exclude is often dictated by the
legal concepts this article will discuss.
A. Beach Access and Use Under the Public Trust Doctrine
While land below the high-water line is held in public trust by the
state, the dry-sand beach above it is not within the state’s purview under
the traditional public trust doctrine.59 This arrangement has led to two
issues regarding beach access:
(1) public rights to so-called perpendicular access—that is, the
right to proceed from an upland position toward the ocean across
the property owner’s private property (including the dry-sand
beach) to a point on the wet-sand beach (the area of the beach
that lies seaward of the mean high tide line); and (2) public rights
to so-called lateral access—that is, once on the beach, the right
to proceed up and down the beach by use of the dry-sand portion

58. Examples of the measures littoral owners have taken to exclude beachgoers from
reaching the ocean from their land include “removing beach access signage, putting up no
trespassing or private property signs, adding vegetation to block or hide access points or
make it appear as if it is private property, erecting fences and hiring private security to
turn away beachgoers.” Beach Access, supra note 7. Malibu, California has had a number
of infamous incidents and legal battles over beach access. See, e.g., Martin Kasindorf,
Malibu’s Rich and Famous Fight to Keep Beach Private, USA TODAY, May 3, 2002,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/03/malibu-usatcov.htm.
59. BAUR, supra note 2, at 48.
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and to use that portion of the beach for recreational activities
such as sunbathing.60
However, “[a]s a general rule, lateral or horizontal access along the wet
sand area is a public right.”61
The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly answered
whether the public trust doctrine applies to public rights of beach access
and use. However, two cases have “shed light on this question.”62 In
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the California Coastal
Commission attempted to condition the issuance of a permit for
rebuilding an oceanfront home on the owners granting a public easement
across their land to reach two adjacent public beaches, without the
owners receiving any compensation for the easement. 63 The Coastal
Commission claimed that this was necessary to promote the legitimate
state interest of counteracting the new, bigger home’s obstruction of a
view of the ocean.64 However, the Court struck the condition down,
holding that the easement created a taking of a property right and that it
had no “essential nexus” with removing obstacles to a clear view of the
ocean.65 Therefore, “by requiring states to closely link the condition
imposed on the beachfront property owner to the problem the condition
seeks to resolve, [Nollan] arguably raises the bar for states seeking to
invoke the [public trust] doctrine to impose easements allowing lateral
access across beach property.”66
The second case was decided the following year. In Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Court acknowledged that various states
have expanded the public trust doctrine to include recreational and
economic activities beyond the traditional purposes of fishing,
commerce, and navigation.67 Therefore, by implication, the public trust
doctrine can be utilized to permit the beach access necessary to carry out
these protected activities.68
While the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on
whether beach access and use are rights protected under the public trust
doctrine, various state courts have dealt with the issue. For instance, in
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 49.
483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
Id. at 828-29.
Id. at 836-37.
BAUR, supra note 2, at 49.
484 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1988).
BAUR, supra note 2, at 50.
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Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,69 the New Jersey Supreme
Court expanded on their previous ruling in Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, which held that the public trust doctrine
protected recreational activities on municipally owned dry-sand
landward of the high-water mark, 70 to hold that the public has a right of
access on a privately owned beach to pursue public trust activities.71 The
New Jersey court did not base its decision on legal doctrines like
“prescriptive easements or customary law, but rather on the fact that in
reality, the public must be able to use the dry-sand area of a beach in
order to enjoy the wet-sand area.”72 In summarizing its expansive view
of the public trust doctrine,73 the court commented that “the public trust
doctrine [is] not [perceived] to be ‘fixed or static,’ but one to ‘be molded
and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was
created to benefit.’”74 Similarly, California, Hawaii, North Carolina, and
Washington courts have concluded that the public has access rights under
the public trust doctrine.75
However, courts in several other states have been less receptive to
the idea that the public trust doctrine provides a right of access across
private littoral property, advancing a restrictive view of the doctrine.76 In
a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision, the court refused to incorporate
a right of access within fishing and navigation rights, holding that a bill
allowing public right of passage “between the mean high water line and
the extreme low water line” was unconstitutional.77 The court stated that
they could find no authority for the proposition that the public trust
doctrine “include[s] a right to walk on the beach.”78 As previously
mentioned, Massachusetts is one of the few states where littoral owners
take to the mean low-water line as opposed to the high-water line,79 so
69. 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984).
70. 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (N.J. 1972).
71. See URBAN HARBORS INST. OF THE UNIV. MASS. BOS., PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
AND
PUBLIC ACCESS IN NEW JERSEY 2-5 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.localswell.com/files/NJDEP_-_Public_Access_in_NJ__1_.htm [hereinafter
Public Access in New Jersey].
72. Id. at 3; see also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363
(N.J. 1984).
73. See BAUR, supra note 2, at 50-51.
74. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365 (quoting Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 308).
75. BAUR, supra note 2, at 51.
76. Id. at 51-52.
77. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 313 N.E.2d 561, 564
(Mass. 1974).
78. Id. at 567.
79. Beach Access, supra note 7.
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the public trust doctrine does not come into effect until below the lowwater mark, located on land that is permanently submerged. Therefore,
because the wet sand area between the high- and low-water marks
(foreshore) is private property, and the court refused to expand the public
trust doctrine to allow access across it, the public can only fish or
navigate off of private beaches by entering the water at a public access
point and then laterally swimming, boating, or simply wading through
the submerged land.
The Supreme Court of Maine followed suit in Bell v. Town of
Wells.80 Despite the fact that, like Massachusetts, littoral owners in
Maine take to the low-water mark, a state statute “declared [that] (1) ‘the
intertidal lands of the State are impressed with a public trust’ and (2) the
rights of the public in intertidal lands under that public trust included a
right to use that land for recreation.”81 However, the court stated that a
littoral owner held the intertidal land “subject only to the public’s right to
fish, fowl, and navigate.”82 Therefore, the statute was on its face an
unconstitutional taking because the common law reserved no public right
to recreation.83 It is perplexing that fishing and fowling are activities
protected by the public trust doctrine, but the right to recreation (a more
generic and potentially less intrusive activity) is not. This shows that the
common law scope of the public trust doctrine can be vital.
Lastly, a decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that a
claimed public trust right to recreate on dry-sand would damage the
littoral owner, who desired to build a condominium, in a manner
“specifically proscribed” by the Charter of Maryland.84
B. Other Provisions in the Law Permitting Beach Access and Use
Besides the public trust doctrine, states have used various methods to
protect the public’s right to access and use of the beach. For instance,
the state constitutions of Alaska and California guarantee a public right
of access to navigable waters.85 Therefore, the right to perpendicular and
lateral beach access can be inferred.86 Moreover, “North Carolina also
has a constitutional provision that can be interpreted to support a public
80. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
81. BAUR, supra note 2, at 51 (quoting Bell, 557 A.2d at 176).
82. Id. at 51-52.
83. Bell, 557 A.2d at 176-177.
84. Dep’t. of Natural Res. v. Mayor and Council of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 637
(Md. 1975).
85. BAUR, supra note 2, at 50.
86. Id.
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right to beach access.”87 Some states, including North Carolina and
Washington, actually have statutory provisions granting a public right of
access.88 The California Coastal Act creates a balance, setting a goal of
maximizing public access and recreational opportunities while
simultaneously recognizing “constitutionally protected rights of private
property owners.”89 The Coastal Act allows the Coastal Commission to
set conditions on the issuance of permits, including “the dedication of
easements or payment of mitigation fees,” as long as they meet the
essential nexus test established by the Supreme Court in Nollan.90
Beach access advocates have said that Oregon “may have the best
legal protection for the public’s use and access to its coastal land.”91 Its
1967 Beach Bill states that access is guaranteed and “establishes a state
easement on all beaches between the low water mark and the vegetation
line.”92 Because the vegetation line is higher than where the tides will
reach, “the general effect is to grant public access to otherwise dry sand
beaches.”93
The public has also acquired access rights through common law
doctrines such as “public easements by prescription, dedication, or
customary use” and the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).94 A
prescriptive easement over private littoral property can be created by the
public’s open and notorious adverse use of the property continuously
“for a certain prescriptive period.”95 An easement by dedication occurs
when the littoral owner acquiesces in the public’s use of the land and
there is “maintenance or patrolling of the beach by municipal
authorities.”96 Easements can also be inferred from the doctrine of
customary use, which “relies on public use that is ancient, exercised
without obligation, reasonable and not offensive to an existing law or
custom.”97

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting California Coastal Act, CAL. PUB. RES. § 30001.5 (West 2013)).
90. Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The
Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 9394 (2011); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987).
91. Beach Access, supra note 7.
92. Id.
93. Patricia Pattison & Donald Sanders, The Dynamic Boundaries of Oceanfront
Property, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 5, 20 (2011).
94. BAUR, supra note 2, at 162.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Although the CZMA is federal legislation, it incorporates state
involvement through states’ development of their Coastal Management
Programs (CMPs).98 After a state’s CMP is approved by the federal
government in accordance with the federal consistency requirement, the
federal government must comply with the state’s policies “to the
maximum extent practicable” when taking action that has “reasonably
foreseeable effects” on the coastal zone.99 The CZMA encourages states
“to provide [] public access for recreational purposes” through their
CMPs.100 Before a state’s CMP is approved, the program must address
access to public beaches and other public coastal areas of importance.101
Additionally, some CMPs provide processes for the public to acquire
access rights across private property. For instance, California’s Coastal
Access Program allows private property owners to offer public access
across their property for recreational use under the Offer to Dedicate
(OTD) Public Access Easement Program.102 Since 2006, 205 OTDs have
been created.103
While the public trust doctrine is a powerful tool in creating a public
right of access across private littoral property, it is by no means the
exclusive method. In fact, as shown, some states have had more success
in recognizing these rights through other legal concepts and procedures.
C. A Change of Heart?: The Curious Case of the
Texas Open Beaches Act
Similar to the Oregon Beach Bill, Texas passed the Texas Open
Beaches Act (TOBA) in 1959 which guarantees unrestricted coastal
access.104 However, subsequent legislation and court decisions have
undermined, and perhaps outright eliminated, this guarantee.105
98. Federal Consistency Overview, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/consistency/welcome.html (last visited Apr. 29,
2012).
99. Id.
100. BAUR, supra note 2, at 162.
101. Id.
102. See OCRM in Your State, California Coastal Management: Enhancing Public
Access to Our Coast, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/inyourstate/# (click “CZMP” on “Control Panel” on
right; then click the orange icon that appears furthest south in California on the map) (last
visited Apr. 29, 2012).
103. Id.
104. See Beach Access, supra note 7.
105. See, e.g., Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012); H.R. 770, 2009
Leg., 81st Sess. (Tex. 2009).
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In June 2009, the Texas legislature passed House Bill 770 [HB 770],
which “allows for private development on public beaches on the Bolivar
Peninsula, essentially privatizing them.”106 Many Texans have criticized
HB 770 saying it “sets a dangerous precedent for the entire Texas Coast
and the public’s right to access and use public beaches,” and the Texas
Land Commissioner refused to enforce it.107 Governor Rick Perry, who
allowed HB 770 to pass into law without his signature, nonetheless stated
that a provision in the law allowing littoral owners to rebuild and repair
their homes, “affect[s] the Texas Open Beaches Act [and] is vague,
broad and incomplete, and will likely result in litigation between
homeowners and the state.”108 This was the case even in the event of a
meteorological occurrence (i.e. hurricane that erodes a beach). In
response, later in 2009, voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 9,
which created a constitutional amendment affirming the public’s right to
access and use the state’s beaches.109 Beach access advocates felt
assured that Proposition 9 would prevent future legislation incongruous
with TOBA.110
But the biggest blow to TOBA, in the form of the case Severance v.
Patterson,111 was yet to come. In April 2005, Carol Severance
“purchased three rental homes on Galveston Island.”112 Shortly after,
“Hurricane Rita damaged [her] properties and moved the vegetation
[line] further landward.”113 After discovering that Severance’s property
was seaward of the vegetation line, and hence on a public strip of the
beach, state officials offered her $40,000 to remove her property so as to
comply with the state’s use of a rolling easement114 in TOBA.115
106. Beach Access, supra note 7.
107. Id.
108. Rick
Perry:
Statement
About
HB
770
(June
19,
2009),
http://governor.state.tx.us/news/signature/12634/.
109. Rob Nixon, Texas Constitution: Public Beach Easement Does Roll, WAITING FOR
THE NEXT SWELL (May 24, 2011), http://robnixon.blogspot.com/2011/05/texasconstitution-public-beach.html [hereinafter Nixon].
110. See Beach Access, supra note 7.
111. 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012).
112. Richard J. McLaughlin, Rolling Easements as a Response to Sea Level Rise in
Coastal Texas: Current Status of the Law After Severance v. Patterson, 26 FLA. ST. U. J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 365, 377 (2011), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/
journals/landuse/vol26_2/mclaughlin.pdf [hereinafter McLaughlin].
113. Id.
114. See Forrest Wilder, Beach Bummer: The Texas Supreme Court Guts the Open
Beach Act, THE TEXAS OBSERVER, Mar. 30, 2012, available at
http://www.texasobserver.org/forrestforthetrees/beach-bummer-the-texas-supreme-courtguts-the-open-beaches-act [hereinafter Wilder] (explaining that “[t]he state, for decades,
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Severance and several other littoral property owners rejected the offer
and filed suit to prevent the state from removing the owners’ property
pursuant to TOBA.116
In her suit, Severance alleged that removal of her property would
constitute a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, “violation of substantive due
process [under the Fourteenth Amendment] . . . and . . . an unreasonable
seizure of her property [under the Fourth Amendment].”117 The Federal
District Court dismissed her suit after finding that her constitutional
claims were not ripe until the state actually removed her property.118
Severance appealed her Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, and a Fifth
Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal of the Fifth Amendment claim but
held her Fourth Amendment claim to be ripe.119 The Fifth Circuit panel
certified three questions to the Texas Supreme Court including, inter
alia, whether Texas recognizes a rolling easement that allows public
access and use of the beaches “without proof of prescription, dedication
or customary rights,” and if so, whether that public right is “derived from
common law doctrines or from a construction of [T]OBA.”120
In November 2010, The Texas Supreme Court answered these
certified questions holding “that because deeds dating from the Republic
of Texas in 1840 didn’t explicitly mention a public right of access, no
such right automatically exists.”121 Furthermore, the court held that
easements wiped out by an avulsive event, such as a hurricane, do not
“‘roll’ upland,” whereas an easement “destroyed by imperceptible
erosion” does roll upland. 122 Accordingly, when an easement is
destroyed by an avulsive event, the state must prove an easement is
“established by custom, dedication, or prescription in each individual
case.”123 This decision was met with strong public outcry. The Texas
has enforced a ‘rolling easement,’ so that when erosion, sea-level rise or storms push the
beach back, the strip of public beach moves too.”). For further discussion of rolling
easements, see infra Part IV.B.
115. McLaughlin, supra note 112, at 377-78.
116. Id. at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 378-79.
121. Wilder, supra note 114 (emphasis in original).
122. Timothy Mulvaney, Mulvaney Guest Blog on Severance’s Latest Development:
USE
PROF
BLOG
(July
6,
2011),
Mootness?,
LAND
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2011/07/mulvaney-guest-blog-on-severanceslatest-development-mootness.html [hereinafter Mulvaney].
123. Id.
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Attorney General “excoriated” the decision saying that the court
eliminated the public’s right of access and use of dry-sand without citing
“a single case, rule, precedent, principle, empirical study, scientific
review, or anything else.” The Attorney General, along with Jerry
Patterson, the Texas Land Commissioner; and the defendant in the case,
called for a rehearing.124
Due to this pressure, the court granted a rehearing in 2011, and a
decision was handed down on March 30, 2012.125 In a 5-3 decision,126
the Court reaffirmed its earlier decision, saying “‘the right to exclude
others from privately owned realty is among the most valuable and
fundamental of rights possessed by private property owners’” and that a
right of public enjoyment of the state’s beaches is “‘unsupported by
historic jurisprudence’ and ‘a limitation on private property rights.’”127
Jerry Patterson said that TOBA, at least in this area of Galveston, “is
dead,” calling it “truly a sad day.”128 Critics commented that although
the court stated that the public easement rolls if the changes to a beach
are gradual and imperceptible, the court ignored the “No. 1 truth of
Texas’ coastal geology” that the “beaches are eroding rapidly,”
particularly in light of rising sea levels caused by climate change.129
This case represents a dramatic change in Texas’ law governing
public beach access and use. In just two decisions, Texas went from a
framework that was one of the most protective of the public’s right to
access and use the state’s beaches, to one of the most restrictive, prolittoral owners frameworks. Making the Texas court’s ruling even more
remarkable is that just one year before the first Severance decision,
Texans voted to entrench their right to access and use beaches in the
state’s constitution.130 Clearly, the will of the many was ignored to the
benefit of a few. This illustrates that the one interpreting the rules can
decide the outcome of the game. It remains to be seen if other states’
laws protecting public access are vulnerable to similar court challenges.

124. Wilder, supra note 114.
125. Id.
126. The 2010 decision was decided 6-2, so one Justice changed positions during the
rehearing. See Mulvaney, supra note 122.
127. Wilder, supra note 114.
128. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id.
130. See Nixon, supra note 109 (“While we wait [for the court’s decision on the
rehearing of Severance v. Patterson] it is important to remember that in November of
2009, Texas Voters overwhelmingly decided to enshrine their public beaches and access
to those beaches within the Texas Constitution with the passage of Proposition 9.”).
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D. Is the Public Winning the Fight for Beach Access?
Although there are gradations and a few prominent counterexamples,
it might seem that, in general, the public is winning the battle with
littoral property owners because most coastal states have some form of
recognition of public access rights across private property.131 While
theoretically true, in reality, these rights are rarely exercised.132 Not only
are many oceanfront owners good at deceiving and deterring the public
from crossing and using their private beaches, but much of the public is
either oblivious to the fact that they have these rights, or are simply
unconcerned with them.133
Much of this can be attributed to inadequate infrastructure. For
instance, “[m]ost states report having an insufficient number of public
coastal access points, with some states averaging less than one access
[point] for every ten miles of shoreline.”134 Furthermore, where there is
access, many states lack proper, or have poorly maintained, amenities
such as signs denoting access, public restrooms and showers, trashcans,
and parking spaces.135 Accordingly, educating the public about their
rights and lobbying for expanded funding to improve amenities have
become important causes for interest groups that advocate for beach
access.136
While the law may generally support the public’s rights, external
factors have swung the pendulum back in favor of coastal property
owners.137 Time will tell whether changes in the law and policy will alter
the balance of power between the beach-going public and private upland
owners.
E. The Need for Clarity in States’ Beach Access Laws
It is clear that public beach access rights vary widely from state to
state.138 While some states value highly public access rights, others are
more sensitive to, and accommodating of, private property rights.139
Because beach access varies so much from state to state, state
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Beach Access, supra note 7.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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legislatures and courts should do more to clarify their particular state’s
position so that littoral owners have knowledge of their rights vis-à-vis
the general public’s rights. As we have seen, some states are very
forthcoming about their beach access laws, whereas others have not
taken a clear position.140 Not only does a state need to inform littoral
property owners of if, when, and how the public may cross and use their
land, but state legislatures and courts should also take a greater role in
explaining why public beach access is an important right worthy of
protection. Littoral owners have the right to know why their right of
exclusion is treated differently than landlocked property owners and to
understand the balance of policies and priorities the state has undertaken
in reaching its decision.
IV. “LET ME DO WHAT I PLEASE”
Like other property owners, littoral property owners purchase their
lots with certain hopes and expectations of what they can do with their
property.141 While it is true that landlocked owners are subject to certain
zoning ordinances and building codes, littoral owners encounter an
additional set of challenges and laws when seeking to build on their
coastal lots; as we have seen, things are just different and more complex
when it comes to owning coastal property.142 Littoral property “is often
wedged between a coastal highway and the mean high water mark,
leaving little flexibility for locating structures on land.”143 Coastal
development can obstruct access to views of the beach, jeopardize public
trust rights, harm coastal ecosystems, and deplete resources.144
Additionally, the regulations meant to abate these societal ills are always
susceptible to takings claims.145 Depending on the perspective, these
regulations are usually seen as either red tape that unfairly restricts a
beachfront owner’s rights or important public protections. The following
is an examination of some of these laws and the issues they have raised.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See id.
See BAUR, supra note 2, at 163.
See id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2013]

It’s All Mine, Stay Off, and Let Me Do What I Please

275

A. Setbacks and Other Methods Used to Regulate Coastal Development
States use a variety of laws and procedures to protect coastal regions
from overdevelopment.146 Permits for “certain designated activities, or
for all activities within a designated coastal region” are a popular
methodology.147 For example, the conflict in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council stemmed from the permit the appellant littoral owners
needed to obtain to build their new home, and South Carolina’s
Beachfront Management Act which requires builders to obtain permits
before developing new structures in certain areas, including erosion
control devices like sea walls and bulkheads.148 Like other states, over
the years, South Carolina has amended this act to include more precise
coastal regulation tools.149
One such regulatory tool is the establishment of coastal setbacks.
Setbacks are imaginary lines representing a distance from the water’s
edge where coastal development can begin.150 Not only do setbacks
ensure that littoral owners do not build too close to the state-owned
public trust lands, but they also limit the risks to structures from erosion
and violent storms which cause high surf.151 Approximately half of
coastal states have implemented setbacks lines “creating areas at the
shoreline where development is prohibited or strictly regulated.”152
Setbacks can be placed at a reference point such as the average hightide line, the extreme high tide line, or the vegetation line, or at a simple
numerical measurement such as one hundred feet.153 However, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is critical of
the latter, calling them “arbitrary setback line[s].”154 NOAA claims that
numerical setbacks, while easy to establish, do not always accurately
reflect erosion rates.155 For instance, a one hundred foot setback line
“may not be adequate in a highly erosive area but may be too restrictive

146. See id.
147. Id. at 161.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Construction Setbacks, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/initiatives/shoreline_ppr_setbacks.html (last visited
Apr. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Construction Setbacks].
151. Id.
152. BAUR, supra note 2, at 163.
153. Construction Setbacks, supra note 150.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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in a very stable environment.”156 NOAA recommends establishing
setbacks that are more closely linked with erosion rates.157 Often setback
lines are placed at thirty times the annual erosion rate with the hope that
the structure will last long enough to pay off the typical thirty-year
mortgage.158 However, even these setback lines are not always adequate;
they do not account for “catastrophic storm events” like Hurricane
Katrina.159 Basing setbacks on erosion rates can also be difficult and
costly because determining the erosion rate requires the accumulation of
a good deal of data, some of which is not readily available.160 Because
erosion rates vary with time, setback lines must be periodically examined
and moved.161 For instance, “South Carolina updates their setback lines
and erosion rate data every 8-10 years.”162 Furthermore, although
setback lines based on erosion rates have “more scientific validity and
receiv[e] deference in judicial proceedings,” these complex formulations
often confuse littoral owners, “who can more readily understand the
impact of a fixed setback distance in conceiving their expectations of
uses of the land.”163
Some states have taken more indirect paths to limit coastal
development. For instance, Massachusetts has refused to pay for coastal
infrastructure damaged by storms, erosion, and other natural events.164
The rationale is that if citizens know that the state will not repair roads,
sewer lines, and beach barriers for them, they will be dissuaded from
coastal development, thereby shifting costs to littoral owners.165
Alternatively, states can impose higher costs on littoral owners for
repairs of damaged infrastructure or assess additional taxes to fund
anticipated damage.166 However, these strategies are not without their
risks as states can and have been ensnared in landowner lawsuits alleging
that erosion was “caused by inadequate construction or maintenance of
projects.”167

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
BAUR, supra note 2, at 163.
Id. at 161-62.
Id.
Id. at 162.
Id.
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B. Sea Level Rise and Rolling Easements
Climate change has led to rising sea levels along nearly the entire
coastline of the United States, “and the rate of that rise is expected to
accelerate in the coming decades.”168 Rising sea levels present a myriad
of risks including greater beach erosion, coastal flooding, and saltwater
intrusion into aquifers.169 According to the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), there are three basic responses to sea level
rise: (1) shore protection, including beach renourishment projects and
construction of seawalls and bulkheads; (2) accommodation through
“coping strategies,” such as placing buildings on pilings; and (3) retreat,
where people gradually move further inland as the sea level rises.170 Of
the three options, the EPA suggests that retreat is best in the long run.171
In terms of accommodation, only so much can be done, and the option
becomes no longer sustainable.172 Although shoreline protection is a
viable option for stopping the water, it carries a bevy of negative
repercussions and risks because it would “eventually eliminate tidal
wetlands, destroy ocean habitat through dredging, expose millions of
people to the hazards of living below sea level, and become
economically unsustainable in many areas where it initially seemed
successful.”173
Accordingly, some areas have accepted retreat through the form of
rolling easements. With rolling easements, littoral owners cannot stop
the ocean from coming in through shore protection measures, but all
other types of public and private use are allowed.174 As the water moves
further inland, the easement “automatically moves or ‘rolls’ landward,”
allowing wetlands and other tidal habitats to “migrate naturally” without
disturbing the natural disposition of sediments.175 The advantage of
rolling easements is that “[u]nlike setbacks, which prohibit
development,” rolling easements place no constraints on the littoral
168. JAMES G. TITUS, ROLLING EASEMENTS 1 (Climate Ready Estuaries 2011),
http://www.epa.gov/cre/downloads/rollingeasementsprimer.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,
2013).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 130-32.
172. Id. at 1.
173. Id. at 1, 4.
174. Erosion Control Easements, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/initiatives/shoreline_ppr_easements.html (last visited
Apr. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Erosion Control Easements].
175. Id.
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owner (other than prohibiting shore protection); in essence, littoral
owners can
build anywhere on their property with the understanding that
they will not be able to prevent shoreline erosion by armoring
the shore, or the public from walking along the shore—no matter
how close the shoreline gets to their structure. If erosion
threatens the structure, the owner will have to relocate the
building or allow it to succumb to the encroaching sea. . . .
[E]ventually, as the shore continues to erode, the structure that
was once on private property, will be sitting on public land. At
this point, the private owner could decide to relocate the
structure inland. Alternately, the property owner could allow the
structure to remain until it becomes unsafe and pay rent to the
state for use of public land.176
Therefore, with rolling easements the beachfront owner has greater
latitude to determine how and when to confront the problem of sea level
rise: “[l]andowners are not prevented from using their property; they
simply are prevented from protecting it when doing so eliminates
tidelands.”177 This allows the state to retain sovereignty of public trust
lands while giving the littoral owner the feeling invoked by private
property rights. Consequently, the state becomes less vulnerable to
takings claims.178
C. An Overview of Coastal Regulations and Takings Claims
The United States Supreme Court has identified two prototypical
types of takings scenarios: (1) the government’s “permanent physical
invasion” or confiscation of property, and (2) a regulation that “goes too
far” in limiting what the owner may do with his or her property.179 While
“it is generally incontrovertible that there has been a taking of private
property requiring compensation” with the former, the latter requires
much more thought and analysis.180 More contemporary Supreme Court
cases have focused on the “economic impact of the regulation on the
176. Id.
177. James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to
Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279,
1390 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/downloads/
takings.pdf [hereinafter Titus, Rising Seas].
178. Id.
179. BAUR, supra note 2, at 165.
180. Id.
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property owner and the degree to which the owner’s distinct investmentbacked expectations have been frustrated,” finding that “when the
landowner has lost all economically beneficial use of the property,
generally a taking has occurred.”181
For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,182 a
coastal developer sought to build residential homes on a barrier island off
the coast of South Carolina.183 When he applied for a permit, he was
denied by the Coastal Council because his proposal violated the state’s
Beachfront Management Act’s mandatory setback lines.184 As a result of
the denial, Lucas was “effectively prohibit[ed] from building any
structures on the property.”185 Lucus challenged the denial of his permit,
but the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected his claim of a regulatory
taking, reasoning that the statute “sought to prevent serious public harm
that results from unwise beachfront development.”186 However, the
Supreme Court of the United States did find that the setback could
constitute a taking because it “deprived the land of all its economic
viability,” and the state eventually purchased the property from Lucas.187
Even more difficult for the Supreme Court to adjudicate are the
cases, like Nollan, “that fall in between a physical invasion and a total
loss of property value.”188 For these, the Court has to undertake case-bycase inquiries that include “factors such as character of the governmental
action and economic impact of the regulation to determine a taking of
property.”189 In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,190 the Court tackled the issue
of whether a landowner is precluded from bringing a takings claim when
the regulation at issue predates the owner’s acquisition of the property.191
In the case, the littoral owner sought to fill coastal wetlands in order to
develop his property, but a state statute prevented him from doing so.192
The Court rejected the state’s argument that Palazzolo lacked standing
because he acquired title to the property after the statute’s enactment,
stating that they were not willing “to put an expiration date on the
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
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505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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Takings Clause.”193 However, the Court held that the regulation did not
amount to a total taking because Palazzolo could develop a small portion
of his property that was upland of the salt marsh, which would have been
worth roughly $200,000 if developed.194 But critics argue that the results
of the cases in this gray area of takings jurisprudence are so perplexing,
inconsistent, and arbitrary that neither littoral owners nor the state can act
with confidence that their actions are or are not allowed by law.195
Lucas exemplifies that setbacks are quite susceptible to takings
claims. If the setback makes property unbuildable, a littoral owner likely
has a valid takings claim.196 An issue is also presented if the state creates
a setback that is landward of an existing structure.197 While the structure
is usually “grandfathered in” and allowed to remain, it typically must
comply with the new setback if the structure is damaged and in need of
being rebuilt.198 NOAA advises that setbacks “should clearly stipulate
when (or if) it would be allowable for a building damaged or destroyed
by a storm or chronic erosion to be rebuilt” and points to Maine’s rule as
a good example: if the repairs will cost more than half of the existing
structure’s value, it must comply with the setback.199 NOAA suggests
that one way to avoid takings claims is to “ensure [that] waterfront lots
are sufficiently deep to allow for relocation as the shore retreats.”200 In
addition, NOAA asserts that states should create clear rules on whether
and how setbacks move as the beach receives alluvion through natural
and artificial accretion.201 As an example, NOAA points to New Jersey’s
rule that denies a setback waiver for an accreting beach unless the
applicant “can show the accreted beach offers sufficient increased
protection from erosion.”202
In theory, perhaps the best way to avoid takings claims with setbacks
is to not use them and to instead utilize rolling easements.203 Because
rolling easements only prevent littoral owners from buttressing the shore,
owners “do not suffer large economic deprivations, and the many
decades that will pass before the property is lost imply a small present
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discounted value for whatever future loss one expects.”204 Rolling
easements usually only reduce property values by less than one
percent.205 Therefore, “the government could acquire rolling easements
through eminent domain for less than one percent of current land
values.”206 However, NOAA states that rolling easements are most
effective when used in conjunction with setbacks and other
restrictions,207 so while rolling easements are an extremely effective and
low-risk coastal regulation tool, they are not a panacea for the problem of
coastal overdevelopment.
D. Does the “Winner” of this Battle Depend on
One’s Definition of “Winning?”
Declaring a winner between private beachfront owners and the state
in development of coastal zones is not an easy task. While unchallenged,
the state can regulate littoral owners to the point that they can build little
more than sand castles on their property. However, takings claims have
provided littoral owners with ample recourse when the regulations are
completely burdensome and unfair. When the regulations are less
severe, but still quite restrictive, court decisions are precarious and
inconsistent. So, whom do we declare the victor: the state that can push
the edge of reasonableness or the littoral owner who can help define the
edge of reasonableness through litigation?
Results can vary from one type of regulation to another. If winning
is defined as being in control, the state wins with setbacks because it
decides where coastal development begins and ends. Then again, courts
can pull the states back if they overreach. With rolling easements, the
littoral owner gets to do what he or she wants with the property, but
when the water comes rushing in, the littoral owner has few options—
move or let the property be swept away so that in the end, the state gets
what it wants anyway.
However, by formulating fair, reasoned, and clear coastal
development policies, the state can create an environment more
conducive to win-win scenarios for the general public and littoral
owners.
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E. Recommendations for Improved Coastal Development Regulations
By heeding some of NOAA’s criticisms and advice and taking other
logical steps forward, states can create more effective and clear coastal
regulations that foster consensus among the public and beachfront
owners and leave everyone more informed.
When devising setbacks, states should rely on science-based erosion
rates rather than choosing arbitrary distances from the water’s edge.
However, states should also translate and explain this scientific
information in a comprehensible manner for littoral owners so that they
can better understand the possible uses of their property. Because this
data can be difficult and expensive to obtain, states should act now to
ensure that their coastal agencies maintain good, readily accessible
records of the state’s entire coastline, so that a solid foundation of
available information is built for future use. This data should be
frequently collected so that the records can be constantly updated with
only minimal changes necessary, as opposed to needing to note drastic
changes because large amounts of time have passed between collections.
Additionally, states should ensure that oceanfront lots are sufficiently
deep to allow for relocation as water moves in, and they should take
catastrophic events like hurricanes and tidal waves into account when
formulating distances where it is safe for development to begin. Like
Maine and New Jersey, states also need to clearly delineate policies
regarding (1) whether existing structures seaward of later-established
setbacks can be rebuilt if damaged, and (2) whether setbacks move after
the beach accretes.
Finally, states that have not already done so should adopt the use of
rolling easements. While other coastal regulations and procedures will
continue to be needed to address various coastal development issues,
rolling easements are essential tools in mitigating many of these
concerns. As sea levels continue to rise and the public’s desire to visit
beaches increases, preserving natural shorelines will continue to be a
major state interest. Rolling easements provide the easiest, lowest-risk,
and most accommodating way to meet these goals.
V. CONCLUSION
People fortunate enough to own oceanfront property encounter a
unique set of issues that landlocked property owners do not. Their rights
and desires at times conflict with laws and policies that seek to protect
the public’s right to enjoy coastal zones, and if they cannot be reconciled,
then one right must be prioritized over the other.
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Although property owners have the right to receive additional land
created by artificial accretions and relictions, we have seen the highest
court in the land declare that, fair or not, owners do not continue to have
these rights after the state undertakes a project to restore beaches for the
public’s benefit. However, Stop the Beach Renourishment was an
extraordinary case, and although some changes in the law may be
helpful, the state and littoral owners have generally forged a compromise
that benefits everyone.
Public access laws vary greatly from state to state. Some states have
created or interpreted laws in favor of public access and use over private
littoral property, while others have not. Furthermore, courts have used a
variety of common law doctrines and statutes in making their
determinations. While it may seem that the public has the upper hand in
this battle, the reality is that few people exercise their public access and
use rights because they are not aware they have them, and there are
insufficient amenities conducive to creating a pleasurable experience at
the beach. States should take a proactive role in defining their respective
public access laws and explaining to littoral owners why the public needs
to be able to cross their land.
States have regulated coastal development in a variety of ways.
However, they should address several details before implementing
setbacks so that they can obviate many littoral owners’ frustrations and,
consequently, possibly avoid takings claims. Rolling easements will
become an increasingly important tool as sea levels continue to rise with
climate change and the public’s desire to flock to the nation’s beaches
grows even stronger. Not only do rolling easements provide littoral
owners with greater options for use of their lands, but they help to create
a regulatory environment where everyone gets to enjoy coastal zones in
their own way. Accordingly, everyone wins.

